Arad and Rubinstein (2012a) have designed a novel game to study level-k reasoning experimentally. Just like them, we find that the depth of reasoning is very limited and clearly different from equilibrium play. We show that such behavior is even robust to repetitions, hence there is, at best, little learning. However, under time pressure, behavior is, perhaps coincidentally, closer to equilibrium play. We argue that time pressure evokes intuitive reasoning and reduces the focal attraction of choosing higher (and per se more profitable) numbers in the game.
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Introduction
In a recent paper, Arad and Rubinstein (2012a) -henceforth, AR -have introduced a new two-player game, called the 11-20 money request game. This game can be regarded as a useful tool to explaining behavior and is related to the prominent concept of level-k reasoning, which was introduced by Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995) and Nagel (1995) . 1 In general, the letter "k" denotes the steps (or depth) of reasoning of a particular subject when facing a strategic problem. Therefore, a level-0 type is a non-strategic decision maker who randomizes over the available strategies. On the contrary, the behavior of a level-k type (Lk), for any k ≥ 1, is a best response to the belief that other players are a level k -1 type. This implies that level-k models feature (i) a L0 behavior, which is the starting point for iterative reasoning, and
(ii) a distribution of types.
The 11-20 money request game by AR is a simultaneous move game where two players request a number of points between 11 and 20, which they receive for sure. One player may receive 20 extra points if she requests one point less than the other player does. 2 This very simple and straightforward game has a number of notable features that make it suitable for studying level-k reasoning (see AR for an elaborate discussion). Compared to many games, like the beauty-contest game or normal form games, actions in the 11-20 game create no payoff externalities, for which reason social preferences become unimportant and negligible.
The level-0 type specification is appealing, as choosing 20 is (the most profitable) anchor for an iterative reasoning process. Furthermore, best-responding is straightforward, as it requires undercutting the other player by one unit.
The game has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, but a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the strategies from 15 to 20 are chosen with positive probabilities (see Table 1 below).
In their paper, AR find that experimental play is significantly different from equilibrium play, and that the level of reasoning is fairly limited, with subjects typically not choosing more than three steps of reasoning. 
Experimental design
Our experiment consists of two parts. Part one is a one-shot version of the 11-20 game (the rules of which have been introduced above; see an online-supplement for experimental instructions). Part one has three different treatments explained below. Part two is a five-fold repetition of the 11-20 game with the same partner (fixed partner matching, where partners differ from part one, though). It is explained only after the conclusion of part one, and no feedback about part one is given until the whole experiment is finished. Part two is identical in all experimental sessions and has no treatment variations.
The first treatment in part one, BASE, is a replication of the basic version of AR. The second treatment, BASE-T, is a modification of BASE in order to make it comparable to the third treatment, TIME. In the treatment with time pressure, TIME, we explain only the basic features of the game in the instructions, i.e., that it is a two-person game, that subjects will be able to choose a number from an interval that will be disclosed when the experiment starts, that subjects earn the amount of points equivalent to the chosen number, and that subjects may earn 20 bonus points under specific conditions. The details -that the interval was [11, 20] and that 20 bonus points could be earned if one player's number was one unit below the other 4 player's number -are only disclosed when the experiment starts and subjects have only 15 seconds time to read this information and make a choice. If these details had been disclosed before the start of the experiment, it would not have been possible to implement time pressure, because subjects would have had the chance to make up their mind while the experiment was still explained.
In order to have a comparison treatment that mimics TIME as far as possible, we implement our second treatment, BASE-T, which is identical to TIME, except that subjects have three minutes time -instead of 15 seconds -to read the information on the first screen and enter their decision.
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After part one, subjects in all three treatments are told that this game (with the same rules as in treatment BASE) is played for five more periods in partner matching, with three minutes time for making decisions in each period, and with feedback after each period. We denote the data in the repetition as R-BASE, R-BASE-T, and R-TIME to identify which treatment subjects have had in part one.
We have four sessions with 20 subjects each for each of the three treatments (using zTree, Fischbacher, 2007, and ORSEE, Greiner, 2004). This yields 80 subjects per treatment, and a total of 240 participants. Experiments were conducted at the University of Innsbruck using a standard subject pool across all disciplines. In our sample 52% of participants were female. On average, subjects earned 7.90 Euros.
Results
Part one -One-shot game
In treatment TIME, 65 out of 80 subjects were able to make a decision within the time constraint (the 15 remaining subjects did not receive any payment for part one; we also exclude their data in the analysis of part two below). Table 1 presents in the first row the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium distribution (assuming that players maximize the expected monetary payoff). In the second row we show the data of AR for comparison reasons; and below we present the data of our three treatments. Both treatments, BASE and BASE-T, are significantly different from equilibrium play, though (p < 0.01; χ²-tests), again confirming AR.
In contrast to these findings, the results in TIME look markedly different. With time pressure, the distribution of chosen actions shifts leftward. It is significantly different from BASE-T (p = 0.025; χ²-test). It is also no longer significantly different from equilibrium play (p = 0.18; χ²-test). One might think that the latter result would be a consequence of random play in TIME -given the demanding environment -but this is not the case, since the distribution of choices is significantly different from random play (p < 0.01; χ²-tests). 5 Rather, we see that less time leads to a lower frequency of sophisticated choices 17-19, and that the choice of 15 (in the middle of the range) becomes fairly prominent. We summarize this subsection in
Result 1: Time pressure leads to a situation where subjects' strategy choices correspondperhaps coincidentally -more closely to equilibrium play compared to a situation without time constraints. Table 2 presents the relative frequency of chosen actions across all five periods, and Figure 1 shows the average chosen number in each of the five periods of part two (and the average in part one). Recall that part two was identical in all sessions and thus did not involve any time pressure. The data in Table 2 show that all three distributions are significantly different from equilibrium play (p < 0.01; χ²-tests). Hence, without any time pressure, numbers go up again, as can also be seen in Figure 1 . Interestingly, the exposure to time pressure in part one (in TIME) has an enduring effect on part two insofar as the chosen numbers in part two are significantly smaller in R-TIME than in R-BASE-T (which is the proper comparison), as becomes clear from a regression not reported here (p = 0.002). Table 3 6 presents pairwise comparisons of the three treatments for each period separately. In periods one, two and five there is no statistical difference in any of the treatment comparisons. We find significant differences in two-out-of-three pairwise comparisons in period three and in all comparisons in period 4. 6 Overall, Figure 1 suggests that repetition does not lead to convergence towards the equilibrium distribution of actions, showing that the one-shot results established in AR are robust to potential learning effects when repeating the task. 
Part two -Five-fold repetition of the game
Conclusion
We have been able to replicate the results by Arad and Rubinstein (2012a) on behavior in a novel two-person game that allows studying strategic behavior. The level of reasoning has been fairly limited, and overall behavior diverges considerably from equilibrium play. This is also true when the game is repeated, which is the first and main contribution of our paper, indicating that behavior is robust against learning. The finding that no "adjustment" of level-0 types took place in later rounds, is quite surprising and might be further explored in future research. However, and this is the second contribution of our paper, introducing time pressure in the 11-20 game has shifted behavior in the direction of (mixed strategy) equilibrium, although the shift may be coincidental. Decisions that are made faster are described by Rubinstein (2007) as intuitive. In contrast, cognitive decisions require more time, which might lead subjects in the 11-20 game to be attracted by the higher sure payoffs the longer they think about the game. AR (2012) 4% 0% 3% 6% 1% 6% 32% 30% 12% 6% 108 BASE 1% 3% 4% 6% 3% 6% 20% 38% 14% 6% 80 BASE-T 4% 1% 1% 8% 6% 5% 15% 34% 19% 8% 80 TIME 3% 3% 11% 5% 20% 5% 18% 17% 11% 8% 65 R-BASE 0% 1% 2% 2% 7% 11% 20% 24% 21% 13% 400 R-BASE-T 1% 3% 2% 4% 8% 9% 21% 22% 18% 12% 400 R-TIME 3% 3% 3% 5% 8% 11% 18% 24% 12% 13% 325 Period in Part two BASE BASE-T TIME R-BASE R-BASE-T R-TIME
